Why do we believe in gods? Religious belief not linked to intuition or rational thinking, new research suggests
Are people born with the propensity to be religious, as some studies seem to have shown?
It is even claimed in some religious apologetic circles that somehow being religious is the natural state, either an evolved genetic predisposition, or, in fundamentalist creationist apologetics, that God intelligently designed us to be religious (obviously it couldn't have evolved, that would be heretical!).
Strangely, this god intelligently designed us to be religious but couldn't make us all have the 'one true religion'.
Of course, the bottom line is that somehow, atheism is unnatural, even perverse and definitely not something God intended.
The basis for that view of the origin of religiosity is based on the idea that religious belief is based on intuition rather than rational, analytical thinking (the Intuitive Belief Hypothesis). Certainly, arguments for creationism are invariable intuitive or more accurately, incredulitive, "I don't understand it, or can't believe it, therefore God!"
Now a new study by academics from Coventry and Oxford universities casts considerable doubt on this view and suggests that intuitive vs analytical thinking actually don't have much bearing on religious belief.
According to this news item from Coventry University:
Religious beliefs are not linked to intuition or rational thinking, according to new research by the universities of Coventry and Oxford.The study by academics from Coventry University’s Centre for Advances in Behavioural Science and neuroscientists and philosophers at Oxford University, was published yesterday in Scientific Reports. The team started their research by interviewing pilgrims on one of the longest pilgrimage routes in the world – the Camino de Santiago de Compostela, in northern Spain.
Previous studies have suggested people who hold strong religious beliefs are more intuitive and less analytical, and when they think more analytically their religious beliefs decrease.
But new research, by academics from Coventry University’s Centre for Advances in Behavioural Science and neuroscientists and philosophers at Oxford University, suggests that is not the case, and that people are not ‘born believers’.
The study – which included tests on pilgrims taking part in the famous Camino de Santiago and a brain stimulation experiment – found no link between intuitive/analytical thinking, or cognitive inhibition (an ability to suppress unwanted thoughts and actions), and supernatural beliefs.
Instead, the academics conclude that other factors, such as upbringing and socio-cultural processes, are more likely to play a greater role in religious beliefs.
What drives our belief in gods – intuition or reason; heart or head? There has been a long debate on this matter but our studies have challenged the theory that being a religious believer is determined by how much individuals rely on intuitive or analytical thinking. We don’t think people are ‘born believers’ in the same way we inevitably learn a language at an early age. The available sociological and historical data show that what we believe in is mainly based on social and educational factors, and not on cognitive styles, such as intuitive/analytical thinking.
Religious belief is most likely rooted in culture rather than in some primitive gut intuitionMiguel Farias, Lead author
Brain, Belief, & Behaviour Lab, Centre for Advances in Behavioural Science,
Coventry University, Coventry, UK
Known as the Camino, pilgrim trails from all over western Europe converge on northern Spain then follow one of two routes: the southerly, or French route, and a northern route which more or less hugs the north coast of Spain. Both end at the Cathedral of Santiago de Compostela in the far north-west.
Traditionally, anyone who completes the Camino is absolved of all sin and receives a certificate to say so. An entire and very lucrative industry has grown up around serving the needs of pilgrims on route to absolution.
Pilgrims on the Camino were asked about the strength of their beliefs and the length of time spent on the pilgrimage and were assessed for their levels of intuitive thinking with a probability task, where they had to decide between a logical and a ‘gut feeling’ choice. The results showed no link between strength of supernatural belief and intuition.
AbstractFor the first study participants were asked to choose one of two bowls containing transparent and coloured beads from which to try to pick a coloured bead:
According to the Intuitive Belief Hypothesis, supernatural belief relies heavily on intuitive thinking—and decreases when analytic thinking is engaged. After pointing out various limitations in prior attempts to support this Intuitive Belief Hypothesis, we test it across three new studies using a variety of paradigms, ranging from a pilgrimage field study to a neurostimulation experiment. In all three studies, we found no relationship between intuitive or analytical thinking and supernatural belief. We conclude that it is premature to explain belief in gods as ‘intuitive’, and that other factors, such as socio-cultural upbringing, are likely to play a greater role in the emergence and maintenance of supernatural belief than cognitive style.
Introduction
What drives our belief in gods — intuition or reason; heart or head? There is a long debate in philosophy about the supposed irrationality or rationality of supernatural beliefs1,2 and, for over a century, sociologists have predicted the triumph of rationality and the disappearance of religion3. It has taken longer for psychologists to add to this discussion, but the last 20 years have seen some advances. The cognitive psychological literature advocates a direct link between intuitive thinking and belief in gods, by explaining that such beliefs are innate, pre-conscious, an experiential form of information processing, and the outcome of a hyperactive device of agency seeking4,5.
Intuitive thinking (associated with ‘System 1’ processing) involves rapid processing of information with little explicit deliberation. It is contrasted with analytical thinking (associated with ‘System 2’ processing) which is slower, deliberate, and effortful6,7. While System 1 is the default system of processing information, it can be overridden by System 2. Within this two-system framework, believing in the supernatural is considered to be an intuitive, non-rational form of information processing. This hypothesis suggests that supernatural beliefs are the result of an overgeneralization of a default system whereby the cause of events is attributed to supernatural agents, without looking for further explanations in an analytical way4,8,9,10. Thus, the suggestion is that while we have all cognitively evolved to be ‘born believers’11, the strength of supernatural belief may be predicted by how much individuals rely on intuitive versus analytic thinking12. We will refer to the proposal that supernatural belief is rooted in an intuitive form of thinking as the Intuitive Belief Hypothesis.
Experimental attempts to validate this hypothesis have focused less on intuition per se than on analytical thinking. For example, it has been shown that highly analytical thinkers have lower rates of supernatural beliefs than ‘intuitive’ individuals13. These and other studies, where experimentally increasing analytical thinking was associated with lower supernatural belief14, have been taken to support the view that to believe in gods and spirits is the natural outcome of the working of our intuitive system, and that this disposition can be overridden or corrected through analytical thinking.
There are, nonetheless, limitations to this approach, ranging from a lack of studies with ecological validity, the use of a culturally limited sample (mostly North American university students), to the overreliance on enhancing analytical rather than intuitive thinking, as it is generally assumed that an increase in analytical thinking means a concurrent decrease in intuitive thinking. It is not clear, however, whether the intuitive-analytical systems work together in a hydraulic-like way, so that an increase in one necessarily leads to a decrease in the other. On the contrary, it is possible that, despite some interactions, they work as ‘two minds in one brain’15. This might explain the evidence suggesting that supernatural beliefs might coexist with logical, scientific knowledge16, or why studies of tribal societies have depicted the existence of rational, instrumental thinking alongside supernatural ideas and rituals17. Likewise, cognitive studies have showed that believers in the supernatural and skeptics do not differ in their scientific knowledge about energy, though believers are able to hold both factual and supernatural information about energy as a ‘living or vital force’18. Other studies, using brain-imaging techniques, suggest that anatomically different areas of the brain are involved when one generates belief-based reasoning (the ventral medial prefrontal cortex) or logical reasoning (right prefrontal cortex)19.
In our first two studies, we investigated whether there was a relationship between supernatural beliefs and intuitive thinking in a way that adds to past approaches by broadening the population and methods used. To this end, we started by using an ecological prime for supernatural belief with a varied population, and tested its effects on intuitive thinking. Previous studies have relied primarily on undergraduate populations and supernatural primes that are far removed from everyday spiritual experiences. To overcome these limitations, we conducted a field study on the pilgrimage route to Santiago of Compostela that crosses most of northern Spain, a walk that takes around 30 days starting at the French Pyrenees. We chose this pilgrimage because it allowed for a measure of interaction with supernatural beliefs (length of time on pilgrimage), as well as having a particularly varied pool of participants, concerning religious affiliation and nationality. We used a probability bead game which allows for both analytical and intuitive responses. Participants were asked to draw a color bead from two containers, which had different quantities of colored and transparent beads. After the task, participants rated supernatural identification of religiosity and spirituality (‘How religious/spiritual do you consider yourself to be?’). Moreover, they reported the number of days they had been on pilgrimage. If the Intuitive Belief hypothesis is true, we expected that the length of time spent on pilgrimage would make participants more engaged with supernatural ideas, and thus increase intuitive thinking. Secondly, we expected pilgrims who identified more strongly as religious or spiritual to have higher intuitive thinking scores in the probability task.
In the second study we used a different paradigm from the dual-processing literature to examine the role of intuitive thinking in the endorsement of supernatural beliefs. We followed a reverse logic to that of the main Intuitive Belief Hypothesis literature, in that instead of enhancing analytical processing we aimed to deplete it by manipulating working memory load. We expected, if the Intuitive Belief Hypothesis were true, that by depleting analytical thinking we would enhance reliance on intuitive processing and, subsequently, strengthen supernatural beliefs.
If Systems 1 and 2 function with some degree of autonomy15 and believers are able to hold both naturalistic and supernatural explanations, we would expect these two studies to show no relationship between intuition and belief. If on the other hand, the Intuitive Belief Hypothesis is true, we would expect to find an association between intuition and belief.
We then turned our attention to analytical thinking, since the cognitive literature on belief attempts to enhance the functioning of this system. Previous authors have suggested that analytic processing may inhibit supernatural beliefs14. There is a large literature on cognitive inhibition, which has been defined as ‘the stopping or overriding of a mental process, in whole or in part, with or without intention’20. Much of the neuroimaging literature points to the right Inferior Frontal Gyrus (rIFG) as the key locus of inhibitory control21, and a recent study has showed a stronger activation of this brain area coupled with a decrease in supernatural attributions22. Since this association remains to be causally tested, in a third study we used brain stimulation to facilitate the rIFG in order to increase cognitive inhibition and measured whether this decreases supernatural beliefs.
Miguel Farias, Valerie van Mulukom, Guy Kahane, Ute Kreplin, Anna Joyce, Pedro Soares, Lluis Oviedo, Mathilde Hernu, Karolina Rokita, Julian Savulescu & Riikka Möttönen
Supernatural Belief Is Not Modulated by Intuitive Thinking Style or Cognitive Inhibition
Scientific Reports 7, Article number: 15100 (2017) doi:10.1038/s41598-017-14090-9
Copyright © 2017 The authors.
Published open access.
Reprinted under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0)
Participants were presented with two different bowls containing a number of transparent and color beads. The smaller bowl always presented a 10% probability of getting the color bead (one out of ten beads), while the larger bowl varied between a 6-9% probability (six to nine out of 100 beads; see Fig. 1). The probabilities in the large bowl were varied according to a Latin Square design (examples of two sequences of presentations of color beads were: 6-9-8-7 and 7-6-8-9). Participants were explicitly told the odds of the color to the transparent beads in each bowl and were then asked to choose one to try drawing the color bead from. After they made their choices, we used a dark cloth to hide the contents of the bowl from the individual and shook the bowl to move the beads. There were 4 trials for each participant. Each participant was offered a chocolate bar for taking part in the study.
To score the trials, we assigned a score of 0 to the analytical choice, a score of 1 to a 9% probability of drawing the color bead from the large bowl, 2 to an 8% probability, 3 to a 7% probability, and 4 to a 6% probability. The smaller bowl was always the analytical choice, but intuitively one may have felt more inclined to choose the larger bowl, as it presented a greater number of color beads (a number of participants reported this in the original study, and this was replicated in our study). Thus, a higher score indicated a more intuitive response.
A second study using mathematical puzzles to assess intuition, again found no correlation between religious belief and intuitive thinking.
Finally, the team used painless electrical stimulation to stimulate the right inferior frontal gyrus of the brain of subjects. Previous studies have shown that this area of the brain is active when Atheists suppress superstitious thoughts. Although this brain stimulation increased cognitive ability, it did not change the level of supernatural belief, again suggesting that there is no link between cognitive ability and religious belief.
This study, whilst not in itself definitive suggests it is at least premature for psychologists to conclude that religion is intuitive or natural. Rather, this study suggests that it is a nurture-based process and develops because of socio-cultural processes, including upbringing and education.
In other words, religions don't come naturally but are cultural impositions. No wonder then that religions invest so much effort into inculcating children with religious ideas and behaviours before they have time to develop the necessary critical thinking skills.
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