Nyota
Image: Ape Initiative
The thing about Creationists is that, whilst they can't make testable predictions and their claims are non-falsifiable, they nevertheless make claims, based not on what the evidence shows, but on what they would like to be true to be as important as they like to imagine they are.
For example, they claim that there are certain features of humans that distinguish us from all the other species (ignoring that all species have unique features, which is what makes them distinct species). Most of these claims will be about our intelligence, social interactions and ethics and our artistic and aesthetic abilities.
Curiously, because they reject the idea that our ability to empathise is the basis of our social ethics, preferring to claim they get their morals from their god because that makes them feel superior to people with a different religion or none, they nevertheless will assert that compassion is one of those uniquely human characteristics that sets us apart from the other animals, so is evidence of our special creation by a magic creator who created everything just for us.
But like so many of their claims, this one turns out to be not only not unique to humans but evidence of common ancestry with the other apes - in this case bonobos, our closest relative. Bonobos have the ability to realise when there is something we don't know and to understand when we need to be educated - something that psychologists beleved was a uniquely human ability.
What information do you have concerning bonobos and their ability to empathise? Bonobos (Pan paniscus) are known for their remarkable capacity for empathy, which has been widely studied by primatologists and psychologists. Their social behaviour demonstrates strong emotional intelligence, cooperation, and conflict resolution skills, making them one of the most empathetic of non-human animals.This was demonstrated by two researchers with Johns Hopkins University's Social and Cognitive Origins Group, published yesterday in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
Key Evidence for Bonobo Empathy
Comparisons with Other Primates
- Consolation Behaviour
- Bonobos console distressed individuals by embracing, touching, and grooming them. Studies, such as those by Frans de Waal and Zanna Clay, show that bonobos, especially juveniles, frequently comfort upset group members.
- Unlike some other primates, bonobos will console unrelated individuals, suggesting a form of empathy that extends beyond kinship or direct social bonds.
- Yawn Contagion
- Bonobos exhibit contagious yawning, particularly when observing familiar individuals yawn. This behaviour is thought to reflect an ability to emotionally resonate with others. Studies indicate that the stronger the social bond, the more likely an individual is to "catch" a yawn.
- Altruism and Helping Behaviour
- Bonobos display spontaneous helping behaviour, even in non-reciprocal situations. Research has shown that they will help strangers obtain food without expecting immediate rewards.
- Experiments at Lola ya Bonobo sanctuary demonstrated that bonobos would unselfishly share food with unfamiliar individuals rather than hoarding it.
- Cooperative Problem Solving
- In contrast to chimpanzees, who often engage in competitive strategies, bonobos are more likely to cooperate when solving tasks. Studies show they work together harmoniously to retrieve food, even when dominant individuals could monopolize resources.
- Emotional Sensitivity and Social Bonds
- Bonobos are highly sensitive to emotional cues in their group members. Their facial expressions, vocalizations, and body language communicate distress, pleasure, or reassurance.
- They engage in socio-sexual behaviours (such as genital rubbing) to diffuse tension and maintain social harmony, which may be an expression of empathetic bonding.
Neuroscientific Basis
- While chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) also display some empathy, their social structure is more hierarchical and aggressive, often limiting empathetic behaviours to kin or allies.
- Bonobos, in contrast, live in matriarchal societies where social bonds are maintained through affection and non-aggressive conflict resolution, reinforcing their empathetic tendencies.
Conclusion
- Studies of bonobo brains suggest that their limbic system (including the amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex) is more developed than in chimpanzees, which may enhance their capacity for emotional processing and empathy.
Bonobos are among the most empathetic primates, capable of understanding and responding to the emotions of others. Their ability to console, cooperate, and help even strangers suggests a deep-rooted evolutionary foundation for empathy, which may shed light on the development of human social emotions.
Don't know something? Apes can tell
To get treats, apes eagerly pointed them out to humans who didn't know where they were, a seemingly simple experiment that demonstrated for the first time that apes will communicate unknown information in the name of teamwork. The study also provides the clearest evidence to date that apes can intuit another's ignorance, an ability thought to be uniquely human.
Key Takeaways
- Apes can intuit another’s ignorance, an ability thought to be uniquely human.
- When apes know their partners are ignorant, they will point them toward missing information.
The ability to sense gaps in one another's knowledge is at the heart of our most sophisticated social behaviors, central to the ways we cooperate, communicate, and work together strategically. Because this so-called theory of mind supports many of the capacities that make humans unique, like teaching and language, many believe it is absent from animals. But this work demonstrates the rich mental foundations that humans and other apes share—and suggests that these abilities evolved millions of years ago in our common ancestors.
Professor Christopher Krupenye, co-author Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA.
Krupenye and co-author Luke Townrow, a Johns Hopkins PhD student, worked with three male bonobos—Nyota, 25; Kanzi, 43; and Teco, 13, all living at Ape Initiative, a research and education nonprofit. During the experiment one of the bonobos would sit with Townrow, facing each other across a table, the ape on the other side of metal gate. The bonobo would watch as a second person placed a treat, a grape or a Cheerio, under one of three cups. Sometimes Townrow could see where the treat was going, sometimes he couldn't. The bonobo could have the treat if Townrow could find it.
Whether or not Townrow saw where the treat was hidden, he'd say, "Where's the grape?" and then wait 10 seconds. If he'd seen the treat being hidden, during the 10 seconds the ape would usually sit still and wait for the treat. But when Townrow hadn't seen where the treat was hidden, the ape would quickly point to the right cup—sometimes quite demonstratively.
The work is the first to replicate in a controlled setting similar findings from the wild that suggest chimpanzees will vocalize to warn groupmates ignorant to potential threats, such as a snake.Their fingers would point right through the mesh—it was clear what they were trying to communicate. One, Kanzi, who was very food motivated, would point repeatedly in certain phases of the experiment—he'd tap several times to get our attention and was quite insistent about it.
We predicted that if apes are really tracking ignorance, when their partners lacked knowledge they would be pointing more often and more quickly and that's exactly what they did. The results also suggest apes can simultaneously hold two conflicting world views in their mind. They know exactly where the food is, and at the same time, they know that their partner's view of the same situation is missing that information.
Professor Christopher Krupenye.
The team was thrilled to further confirm apes' mental sophistication.
There are debates in the field about the capabilities of primates, and for us it was exciting to confirm that they really do have these rich capacities that some people have denied them.
Professor Christopher Krupenye.
What we've shown here is that apes will communicate with a partner to change their behavior, but a key open question for further research is whether apes are also pointing to change their partner's mental state or their beliefs.
Luke A. Townrow, first author. Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA.
This work demonstrates the rich mental foundations that humans and other apes share—and suggests that these abilities evolved millions of years ago in our common ancestors.
Professor Christopher Krupenye.
Next the team will work to more deeply explore the apes' motivations and how they think about other individuals' minds.
Once again, something proclaimed by creationists as proof of the special creation of humans turns out to be evidence for our common ancestry with the other African apes. This is how you can tell that creationists claims are not based on evidence so are not worth paying attention to.Abstract
Numerous uniquely human phenomena, from teaching to our most complex forms of cooperation, depend on our ability to tailor our communication to the knowledge and ignorance states of our social partners. Despite four decades of research into the “theory of mind” capacities of nonhuman primates, there remains no evidence that primates can communicate on the basis of their mental state attributions, to enable feats of coordination. Moreover, recent reevaluation of the experimental literature has questioned whether primates can represent others’ ignorance at all. The present preregistered study investigated whether bonobos are capable of attributing knowledge or ignorance about the location of a hidden food reward to a cooperative human partner, and utilizing this attribution to modify their communicative behavior in the service of coordination. Bonobos could receive a reward that they had watched being hidden under one of several cups, if their human partner could locate the reward. If bonobos can represent a partner’s ignorance and are motivated to communicate based on this mental state attribution, they should point more frequently, and more quickly, to the hidden food’s location when their partner is ignorant about that location than when he is knowledgeable. Bonobos indeed flexibly adapted the frequency and speed of their communication to their partner’s mental state. These findings suggest that apes can represent (and act on) others’ ignorance in some form, strategically and appropriately communicating to effectively coordinate with an ignorant partner and change his behavior.
A growing body of work suggests that monkeys and apes share with humans rich precursors of theory of mind, the ability to infer the mental states that guide others’ actions (1–3). However, major debates concern what distinguishes human theory of mind in terms of both its functions and its underlying representations. Regarding function, various scholars have argued for decades that what makes humans special is a remarkable propensity for cooperation and that the underlying mechanism is a unique capacity to harness theory of mind to communicate in service of coordination (4). For example, we readily adapt our communication to the knowledge and ignorance states of our partners to change their mental states (5), and behavior, and enable cooperative acquisition of goals. While no research has addressed this ability in nonhuman great apes, two studies shed light on its precursors. First, Grueneisen et al. (6) found that chimpanzees and bonobos can facilitate coordination by adjusting the visibility of their actions for a cooperative partner relative to a competitive one, though their task did not involve communication or experimentally isolate theory of mind. Second, Crockford et al. (7) found that wild chimpanzees may be able to communicate based on a recipient’s mental state: Chimpanzees produced more warning vocalizations in the presence of groupmates who were ignorant about a nearby snake, compared to those who were knowledgeable. However, experiments in controlled and nonthreatening settings are needed to eliminate alternative explanations (e.g., that chimpanzees simply responded to others’ behavior, or were driven by arousal) and to clarify whether this capacity can be deployed flexibly in other contexts and via other communicative modalities. Paradigms with greater control are also essential for isolating the particular cues subjects are sensitive to and constraining the hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms driving this pattern of communication, especially following contradictory findings in captivity (8).
Regarding the underlying representations, a reevaluation of the literature has compellingly shown that controlled studies testing primates’ capacity to represent others’ knowledge or ignorance could be explained by attributing only knowledge-like states called awareness relations (9). This is because past paradigms make positive predictions only about how subjects should act if they have attributed knowledge (e.g., avoid food known to a competitor) but not ignorance (i.e., refs. 1, 3, and 10–12). Thus, no controlled studies have directly tested for primates’ capacity to represent others’ ignorance. One central prediction that distinguishes ignorance representation from deflationary accounts is that only primates who can represent others’ ignorance should be able to act on those representations, for example, through communication.
To clarify the unique functions and representations underlying human theory of mind, we tested whether our closest relatives, bonobos (Pan paniscus), can identify a partner’s ignorance and adapt communication to enable coordination. In a highly controlled preregistered study, captive bonobos could point and remedy a partner’s ignorance. Bonobos could receive a reward that they had watched being hidden under one of several cups, if their human partner could locate the reward. If bonobos can represent a partner’s ignorance and are motivated to communicate based on this mental state attribution, they should point more frequently, and more quickly, to the hidden food’s location when their partner is ignorant about that location than when he is knowledgeable.
L.A. Townrow, & C. Krupenye
Bonobos point more for ignorant than knowledgeable social partners Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 122 (6) e2412450122, DOI; 10.1073/pnas.2412450122 (2025).
Copyright: © 2025 The authors.
Published by National Academy of Science of the USA. Open access.
Reprinted under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0)
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